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Abstract. This paper introduces a newly developed private key cryp-
tosystem and a public key cryptosystem. In the first one, each letter
is encrypted with a different key. Therefore, it is a kind of a one-time
pad. The second one is inspired by the ElGamal cryptosystem. Both
presented cryptosystems are based on automorphisms of free groups.
Given a free group F of finite rank, the automorphism group Aut(F )
can be generated by Nielsen transformations, which are the basis of a
linear technique to study free groups and general infinite groups. There-
fore Nielsen transformations are introduced.
Keywords: private key cryptosystem, public key cryptosystem, free
group F of finite rank, automorphism group Aut(F ), Nielsen transfor-
mations, Whitehead-Automorphisms.
Dedicated to Gabriele Kern-Isberner on the occasion of her 60th birthday1.
1 Introduction
The topic of this paper is established in the area of mathematical cryptology,
more precisely in group based cryptology. We refer to the books [1], [7] and
[13] for the interested reader. The books [1] and [7] can also be used for a first
access to the wide area of cryptology.
We introduce two cryptosystems, the first one is a private key cryptosystem
(one-time pad) and the second one is a public key cryptosystem. We require
that the reader is familiar with the general concept of these types of protocols.
In cryptology it is common to call the two parties who want to communicate
privately with each other Alice and Bob.
Throughout the paper let F always be a free group F = 〈X | 〉 of finite rank.
Both cryptosystems are based on free groups F of finite rank and automor-
phisms of F . It is known that the group of all automorphisms of F , Aut(F ),
can be generated by Nielsen transformations (see [3]).
We first review some basic definitions concerning regular Nielsen transfor-
mations and Nielsen reduced sets and we give additional information which is
1 This article appeared 2016 in College Publications Tributes Volume 29: Compu-
tational Models of Rationality Essays Dedicated to Gabriele Kern-Isberner on
the Occasion of Her 60th Birthday.
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also important for the understanding of the paper.
Both cryptosystems use automorphisms of a free group F of finite rank. Thus,
a random choice of these automorphisms is practical. An approach for this
random choice using the Whitehead-Automorphisms is given. Therefore, the
Whitehead-Automorphisms are reviewed. Note, that the Whitehead-Automor-
phisms generate the Nielsen transformations and vice versa, but the use of the
Whitehead-Automorphisms is more practical if a random choice of automor-
phisms is required.
After this, a private key cryptosystem using Nielsen transformations and Nielsen
reduced sets is introduced. An example and a security analysis for this private
key cryptosystem is given. Finally we explain a public key cryptosystem which
is inspired by the ElGamal cryptosystem, from which we describe two variations
and give an example.
The new cryptographic protocols are in part in the dissertation [12] of
A. Moldenhauer under her supervisor G. Rosenberger at the University of Ham-
burg.
2 Preliminaries for Automorphisms of Free Groups
We now review some basic definitions concerning regular Nielsen transforma-
tions and Nielsen reduced sets and we give additional information which will
be used later on (see also [3], [9] or [10]).
Let F be a free group on the free generating set X := {x1, x2, . . . , xq} and
let U := {u1, u2, . . . , ut} ⊂ F , q, t ≥ 2. A freely reduced word in X is a
word in which the symbols xǫi , x
−ǫ
i , for ǫ = ±1 and i = 1, 2, . . . , q, do not
occur consecutively. We call q the rank of F . The free generating set X is also
called a basis of F . The elements ui are freely reduced words with letters in
X±1 := X ∪X−1, with X−1 := {x−11 , x−12 , . . . , x−1q }.
Definition 1.
An elementary Nielsen transformation on
U = {u1, u2, . . . , ut} ⊂ F is one of the following transformations
(T1) replace some ui by u
−1
i ;
(T2) replace some ui by uiuj where j 6= i;
(T3) delete some ui where ui = 1.
In all three cases the uk for k 6= i are not changed. A (finite) product of elemen-
tary Nielsen transformations is called a Nielsen transformation. A Nielsen
transformation is called regular if it is a finite product of the transformations
(T1) and (T2), otherwise it is called singular. The regular Nielsen transfor-
mations generate a group. The set U is called Nielsen-equivalent to the set
V , if there is a regular Nielsen transformation from U to V . Nielsen-equivalent
sets U and V generate the same group, that is, 〈U〉 = 〈V 〉.
Now, we agree on some notations. We write (T 1)i if we replace ui by u
−1
i
and we write (T 2)i.j if we replace ui by uiuj. If we want to apply the same
Nielsen transformation (T 2) consecutively t-times we write [(T 2)i.j]
t and hence
replace ui by uiu
t
j. In all cases the uk for k 6= i are not changed.
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Definition 2.
A finite set U in F is called Nielsen reduced, if for any three elements
v1, v2, v3 from U
±1 the following conditions hold:
(N0) v1 6= 1;
(N1) v1v2 6= 1 implies |v1v2| ≥ |v1|, |v2|;
(N2) v1v2 6= 1 and v2v3 6= 1 implies |v1v2v3| > |v1| − |v2|+ |v3|.
Here |v| denotes the free length of v ∈ F , that is, the number of letters from
X±1 in the freely reduced word v.
Remark 1. We say that any word w with finitely many letters from X±1 has
length L if the number of letters occurring is L. The length of a word w is
greater than or equal to the free length of the word w. For freely reduced words
the length and the free length are equal. If a word w is not freely reduced then
the length is greater than the free length of w.
Proposition 1. [3, Theorem 2.3] or [9, Proposition 2.2]
If U = {u1, u2, . . . , um} is finite, then U can be carried by a Nielsen transfor-
mation into some V such that V is Nielsen reduced. We have rank(〈V 〉) ≤ m.
Proposition 2. [10, Corollary 3.1]
Let H be a finitely generated subgroup of the free group F on the free generating
set X. Let U = {u1, u2, . . . , ut}, ui words in X, be a Nielsen reduced set. Then,
out of all systems of generators for H, the set U has the shortest total x-length,
that is
∑t
i=1 |ui|.
Remark 2. If FV is a finitely generated subgroup of F = 〈X | 〉, with free
generating set V = {v1, v2, . . . , vN}, vi words in X , then there exist only finitely
many Nielsen reduced sets Ui = {ui1 , ui2 , . . . , uiN}, i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, to V , which
are Nielsen-equivalent. With the help of a lexicographical order <lex (see for
instance [3, Proof of Satz 2.3]) the smallest set Us, in the set of all Nielsen
reduced sets UVNred := {U1, U2, . . . , Uℓ} to V , can be uniquely marked. With
the use of regular Nielsen transformations it is possible to obtain this marked
set Us starting from any arbitrary set in U
V
Nred.
Proposition 3. [3, Korollar 2.10]
Let F be the free group of rank q. Then, the group of all automorphisms of
F , Aut(F), is generated by the elementary Nielsen transformations (T1) and
(T2).
More precisely: Each automorphism of F is describable as a regular Nielsen
transformation between two bases of F , and, each regular Nielsen transforma-
tion between two bases of F defines an automorphism of F .
Remark 3. In [16] an algorithm, using elementary Nielsen transformations, is
presented which, given a finite set S of m words of a free group, returns a set S′
of Nielsen reduced words such that 〈S〉 = 〈S′〉; the algorithm runs in O(ℓ2m2)
time, where ℓ is the maximum length of a word in S.
Theorem 1. [3, Satz 2.6]
Let U be Nielsen reduced, then 〈U〉 is free on U .
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For the next lemma we need some notations. Let w 6= 1 be a freely reduced
word in X . The initial segment s of w which is “a little more than half” of w
(that is, 12 |w| < |s| ≤ 12 |w|+1) is called the major initial segment of w. The
minor initial segment of w is that initial segment s′ which is “a little less
than half” of w (that is, 12 |w| − 1 ≤ |s′| < 12 |w|). Similarly, major and minor
terminal segments are defined.
If the free length of the word w is even, we call the initial segment s of w, with
|s| = 12 |w| the left half of w. Analogously, we call the terminal segment s′ of
w with |s′| = 12 |w| the right half of w.
Let {w1, w2, . . . , wn} be a set of freely reduced words in X , which are not the
identity. An initial segment of a w-symbol (that is, of either wi or w
−1
i , which
are different w-symbols) is called isolated if it does not occur as an initial
segment of any other w-symbol. Similarly, a terminal segment is isolated if it
is a terminal segment of a unique w-symbol.
Lemma 1. [10, Lemma 3.1]
Let M := {w1, w2, . . . , wm} be a set of freely reduced words in X with wj 6= 1,
1 ≤ j ≤ m. Then M is Nielsen reduced if and only if the following conditions
are satisfied:
1. Both the major initial and major terminal segments of each wi ∈ M are
isolated.
2. For each wi ∈ M of even free length, either its left half or its right half is
isolated.
Definition 3.
Let F be a free group of rank q and let G be a free subgroup of F with rank m.
An element g ∈ G is called a primitive element of G, if a basis U of G with
g ∈ U exists.
Proposition 4. [14]
The number of primitive elements of free length k of the free group
F2 = 〈x1, x2 | 〉 (and therefore, in any group Fq = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xq | 〉, q ≥ 2)
is:
1. more than 8
3
√
3
· (√3)k if k is odd;
2. more than 43 · (
√
3)k if k is even.
Theorem 2. [2]
If P (q, k) is the number of primitive elements of free length k of the free group
Fq = 〈x1, x2, . . . , xq | 〉, q ≥ 3, then for some constants c1, c2, we have
c1 · (2q − 3)k ≤ P (q, k) ≤ c2 · (2q − 2)k.
Definition 4. [15]
A subgroup H of F is called characteristic in F if ϕ(H) = H for every
automorphism ϕ of F .
For n ∈ N let Zn := Z/nZ be the ring of integers modulo n. The corresponding
residue class in Zn for an integer β is denoted by β (see also [1]).
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Definition 5. [1]
Let n ∈ N and β, γ ∈ Zn. A bijective mapping h : Zn → Zn given by x 7→ βx+γ
is called a linear congruence generator.
Theorem 3. [1] (Maximal period length for n = 2m, m ∈ N)
Let n ∈ N, with n = 2m, m ≥ 1 and let β, γ ∈ Z such that h : Zn → Zn, with
x 7→ βx + γ, is a linear congruence generator. Further let α ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}
be given and x1 = α, x2 = h(x1), x3 = h(x2), . . ..
Then the sequence x1, x2, x3, . . . is periodic with maximal periodic length n = 2
m
if and only if the following holds:
1. β is odd.
2. If m ≥ 2 then β ≡ 1 (mod 4).
3. γ is odd.
Theorem 4. [8]
Let F be a free group with countable number of generators x1, x2, . . .. Corre-
sponding to xj define
Mj =
(−rj −1 + r2j
1 −rj
)
with rj ∈ Q and
rj+1 − rj ≥ 3
r1 ≥ 2.
Then G* generated by {M1,M2, . . .} is isomorphic to F .
3 The Random Choice of the Automorphisms of Aut(F )
Let F = 〈X | 〉 be the free group on the free generating set X with |X | = q.
The cryptosystems we develop are based on automorphisms of F . These au-
tomorphisms should be chosen randomly. It is known, see Proposition 3, that
the Nielsen transformations generate the automorphism group Aut(F ). For a
realization of a random choice procedure the Whitehead-Automorphisms will
be used.
A fixed set of randomly chosen automorphisms is part of the key space for
the private key cryptosystem.
Definition 6. Whitehead-Automorphisms:
1. Invert the letter a and leave all other letters invariant:
ia(b) =
{
a−1 for a = b
b for b ∈ X \ {a}.
There are q Whitehead-Automorphisms of this type.
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2. Let a ∈ X and L,R,M be three pairwise disjoint subsets of X, with a ∈M .
Then the tuple (a, L,R,M) defines a Whitehead-Automorphisms
W(a,L,R,M) as follows
W(a,L,R,M)(b) =


ab for b ∈ L
ba−1 for b ∈ R
aba−1 for b ∈M
b for b ∈ X \ (L ∪M ∪R).
There are q · 4q−1 automorphisms of this type.
Note, that W−1(a,L,R,M) = ia ◦W(a,L,R,M) ◦ ia.
With this definition it is clear how the Whitehead-Automorphisms can
be generated as a product of regular Nielsen transformations. Conversely, the
Whitehead-Automorphisms generate the group of the Nielsen transformations
and therefore also the automorphism group Aut(F ) (see also [4]). With the
Whitehead-Automorphisms it is simple to realize a random choice of automor-
phisms. We now give an approach for this choice.
An approach for choosing randomly automorphisms of Aut(F ):
Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xq} be the free generating set for the free group F .
1. First of all it should be decided in which order an automorphism fi is
generated by automorphisms of type ia and W(a,L,R,M). For this purpose
an automorphism of type ia is identified with a zero and W(a,L,R,M) with
a one. A sequence of zeros and ones is randomly generated. This sequence
is translated to randomly chosen Whitehead-Automorphisms and hence
presents an automorphism fi ∈ Aut(F ). This translation is as follows:
2.1. For a zero in the sequence we generate ia randomly: choose a random
number z, with 1 ≤ z ≤ q; hence an element a ∈ X must be chosen to
declare the automorphism. Then it is a := xz and hence xz is replaced by
x−1z and all other letters are invariant.
2.2. For a one in the sequence we generate W(a,L,R,M) randomly: choose a ran-
dom number z, with 1 ≤ z ≤ q. Hence it is a := xz . Moreover it is a ∈M .
After this the disjoint sets L,R,M ⊂ X are chosen randomly. One possible
approach is the following:
(a) Choose random numbers z1, z2 and z3 with
0 ≤ z1 ≤ q − 1,
0 ≤ z2 ≤ q − 1− z1,
0 ≤ z3 ≤ q − 1− z1 − z2.
If we are in the situation of z1 = z2 = z3 = 0 we get the identity idX .
If this case arises a random number z˜ from the set {1, 2, . . . , q} \ {z}
is chosen and hence the element xz˜ is assigned randomly to one of the
sets L, R or M ; therefore the identity is avoided.
Cryptosystems Using Automorphisms of Finitely Generated Free Groups 7
It is
|L| = z1, |R| = z2, |M | = z3 + 1.
(b) Choose z1 pairwise different random numbers {r1, r2, . . . , rz1} of the
set {1, 2, . . . , q} \ {z}. Then L is the set
L = {xr1 , xr2 , . . . , xrz1 }.
(c) Choose z2 pairwise different random numbers {p1, p2, . . . , pz2} of the
set {1, 2, . . . , q} \ ({z} ∪ {r1, r2, . . . , rz1}). Then R is the set
R = {xp1 , xp2 , . . . , xpz2 }.
(d) Choose z3 pairwise different random numbers {t1, t2, . . . , tz3} of the set
{1, 2, . . . , q}\({z} ∪ {r1, r2, . . . , rz1} ∪ {p1, p2, . . . , pz2}). ThenM is the
set
M = {xt1 , xt2 , . . . , xtz3} ∪ {a}.
Remark 4. If Alice and Bob use Whitehead-Automorphisms to generate auto-
morphisms on a free group with free generating set X they should take care,
that there are no sequences of the form
1. ia ◦ ia = idX ,
2. W(a,L,R,M) ◦ ia ◦W(a,L,R,M) ◦ ia︸ ︷︷ ︸
=W−1
(a,L,R,M)
= idX or
ia ◦W(a,L,R,M) ◦ ia︸ ︷︷ ︸
=W−1
(a,L,R,M)
◦W(a,L,R,M) = idX ,
for the automorphism fj . They also should not use Whitehead-Automorphisms
sequences for fj, which cancel each other and so be vacuous for the encryption.
4 Private Key Cryptosystem Based on Automorphisms
of Free Groups F
Before Alice and Bob are able to communicate with each other, they have to
make some arrangements.
Public Parameters
They first agree on the public parameters.
1. A free group F with free generating set X = {x1, x2, . . . , xq}, with q ≥ 2.
2. A plaintext alphabet A = {a1, a2, . . . , aN}, with N ≥ 2.
3. A subset Faut := {f1, f2, . . . , f2128} ⊂ Aut(F ) of automorphisms of F is
chosen. It is fi : F → F and the fi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 2128, pairwise different, are
generated with the help of 0-1-sequences (of different length) and random
numbers as described in Section 3. The set Faut is part of the key space.
8 Anja I. S. Moldenhauer and Gerhard Rosenberger
4. They agree on a linear congruence generator h : Z2128 → Z2128 with a
maximal period length (see Definition 5 and Theorem 3).
Remark 5. If the set Faut and the linear congruence generator h are public
Alice and Bob are able to change the automorphisms and the generator publicly
without a private meeting. The set Faut should be large enough to make a brute
force search ineffective.
Another variation could be, that Alice and Bob choose the number of elements
in the starting set Faut smaller than 2128, say for example 210. These starting
automorphism set Faut should be chosen privately by Alice and Bob as their
set of seeds and should not be made public. Then Alice and Bob can extend
publicly the starting set Faut to the set Faut1 of automorphisms such that Faut1
contains, say for example, 232 automorphisms. The number of all elements
in Faut1 should make a brute force attack inefficient. The linear congruence
generator stays analogously, just the domain and codomain must be adapted
to, say for example, Z232 . Because of Theorem 3 Alice and Bob get at all times
a linear congruence generator with maximal periodic length.
Private Parameters
Now they agree on the private parameters.
1. A free subgroup FU of F with rank N and the free generating set
U = {u1, u2, . . . , uN} is chosen where U is a minimal Nielsen reduced set
(with respect to a lexicographical order) and the ui freely reduced words in
X . Such systems U are easily to construct using Theorem 1 and Lemma 1
(see also [3] and [9]). It is UNred the set of all minimal Nielsen reduced sets
with N elements in F , which is part of the key space.
2. They use a one to one correspondence
A→ U
aj 7→ uj for j = 1, . . . , N.
3. Alice and Bob agree on an automorphism fα ∈ FAut, hence α is the common
secret starting point α ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2128 − 1}, with x1 = α ∈ Z2128 , for the
linear congruence generator. With this α they are able to generate the
sequence of automorphisms of the set Faut, which they use for encryption
and decryption, respectively.
The key space: The set UNred of all minimal (with respect to a lexico-
graphical order) Nielsen reduced subsets of F with N elements. The set FAut
of 2128 randomly chosen automorphisms of F .
Protocol
Now we explain the protocol and look carefully at the steps for Alice and
Bob.
Public knowledge: F = 〈X | 〉, X = {x1, x2, . . . , xq} with q ≥ 2;
plaintext alphabet A = {a1, a2, . . . , aN} with N ≥ 2; the set FAut; a linear
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congruence generator h.
Encryption and Decryption Procedure:
1. Alice and Bob agree privately on a set U ∈ UNred and an automorphism
fα ∈ FAut. They also know the one to one correspondence between U and
A.
2. Alice wants to transmit the message
S = s1s2 · · · sz, z ≥ 1,
with si ∈ A to Bob.
2.1. Alice generates with the linear congruence generator h and the knowledge
of fα the z automorphisms fx1 , fx2 , . . . , fxz , which she needs for encryption.
It is x1 = α, x2 = h(x1), . . . , xz = h(xz−1).
2.2. The encryption is as follows
if si = at then si 7→ ci := fxi(ut), 1 ≤ i ≤ z, 1 ≤ t ≤ N.
Recall that the one to one correspondence A → U with aj 7→ uj, for
j = 1, 2, . . . , N , holds. The ciphertext
C = fx1(s1)fx2(s2) · · · fxz(sz)
= c1c2 · · · cz
is sent to Bob. We call cj the ciphertext units. We do no cancellations
between ci and ci+1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ z − 1.
3. Bob gets the ciphertext
C = c1c2 · · · cz,
and the information that he has to use z automorphisms of F from the set
FAut for decryption. He has now two possibilities for decryption.
3.1.a. With the knowledge of fα, the linear congruence generator h and the num-
ber z, he computes for each automorphism fxi , i = 1, 2, . . . , z, the inverse
automorphism f−1xi .
3.1.b. With the knowledge of fα, the set U = {u1, u2, . . . , uN}, the linear congru-
ence generator h and the number z, he computes for each automorphism fxi ,
i = 1, 2, . . . , z, the set
Ufxi = {fxi(u1), fxi(u2), . . . , fxi(uN )}.
Hence, with the one to one correspondence between U and A, he gets a one
to one correspondence between the letters in the alphabet A and the words
of the ciphertext depending on the automorphisms fxi . This is shown in
Table 1.
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Table 1. Plaintext alphabet A = {a1, a2, . . . , aN} corresponded to ciphertext alpha-
bet Ufxi depending on the automorphisms fxi
Ufx1 Ufx2 · · · Ufxz
a1 fx1(u1) fx2(u1) · · · fxz (u1)
a2 fx1(u2) fx2(u2) · · · fxz (u2)
...
...
... · · ·
...
aN fx1(uN) fx2(uN ) · · · fxz (uN )
3.2. With the knowledge of the Table 1 or the inverse automorphisms f−1xi ,
respectively, the decryption is as follows
if ci = fxi(ut) then ci 7→ si := f−1xi (ci) = at, 1 ≤ i ≤ z, 1 ≤ t ≤ N.
He generates the plaintext message
S = f−1x1 (c1)f
−1
x2 (c2) · · · f−1xz (cz)
= s1s2 · · · sz,
with si ∈ A, from Alice.
Remark 6. The cryptosystem is a polyalphabetic system. A word ui ∈ U , and
hence a letter ai ∈ A, is encrypted differently at different places in the plaintext.
Example 1. This example was executed with the help of the computer program
GAP and the package “FGA2”.
First Alice and Bob agree on the public parameters.
1. Let F be the free group on the free generating set X = {a, b, c, d}.
2. Let A˜ := {a1, a2, . . . , a12} = {A,E, I, O, U, T,M,L,K, Y,B,N} be the
plaintext alphabet.
3. A set FAut is determined. In this example we give the automorphisms,
which Alice and Bob use for encryption and decryption, respectively, just
at the moment when they are needed.
4. The linear congruence generator with maximal periodic length is
h : Z2128 → Z2128
x 7→ 5x + 3.
2 Free Group Algorithms, a GAP4 Package by Christian Sievers, TU Braunschweig.
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The private parameters for this example are:
1. The free group FU˜ of F with the free generating set
U˜ ={u1, u2, . . . , u12}
={ba2, cd, d2c−2, a−1b, a4b−1, b3a−2, bc3, bc−1bab−1,
c2ba, c2dab−1, a−1d3c−1, a2db2d−1}.
It is known, that ai 7→ ui, i = 1, 2, . . . , 12, for ui ∈ U˜ and ai ∈ A˜. The set
U˜ is a Nielsen reduced set and the group FU˜ has rank 12. Alice and Bob
agree on the starting automorphism f93, hence it is x1 = α = 93.
We look at the encryption and decryption procedure for Alice and
Bob.
2. With the above agreements Alice is able to encrypt her message
S = I LIKE BOB.
Her message is of length 8. She generates the ciphertext as follows:
2.1. She first determines, with the help of the linear congruence generator h,
the automorphisms fxi , i = 1, 2, . . . , 8, which she needs for encryption. It
is
x1 = α = 93, x2 = h(x1) = 468, x3 = h(x2) = 2343,
x4 = h(x3) = 11718, x5 = h(x4) = 58593, x6 = h(x5) =292968,
x7 = h(x6) =1464843, x8 = h(x7) =7324218.
The automorphisms are described with the help of regular Nielsen trans-
formations, it is
fx1= (N1)3(N2)1.4(N2)4.3(N2)2.3(N1)3(N2)1.4(N2)3.1,
fx1 : F → F
a 7→ ad2c−1, b 7→ bc−1, c 7→ cad2c−1, d 7→ dc−1;
fx2= (N2)1.4(N1)2(N2)2.4(N2)3.1(N1)2(N1)1(N2)1.3[(N2)4.3]
2(N1)3,
fx2 : F → F
a 7→ d−1a−1cad, b 7→ d−1b, c 7→ d−1a−1c−1, d 7→ d(cad)2;
fx3= (N1)2(N2)4.2(N1)4(N2)2.4(N1)2(N2)4.2(N1)3(N2)2.1(N2)3.2
[(N2)1.4]
3(N1)2(N2)4.2,
fx3 : F → F
a 7→ ab3, b 7→ a−1d−1, c 7→ c−1da, d 7→ ba−1d−1;
fx4= [(N2)3.1]
2(N1)2[(N2)2.1]
3(N2)2.4(N2)4.2(N2)1.3,
fx4 : F → F
a 7→ aca2, b 7→ b−1a3d, c 7→ ca2, d 7→ db−1a3d;
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fx5= (N2)1.2(N1)3(N1)1[(N2)4.3]
2(N2)1.2(N1)2(N1)3(N2)2.4(N2)3.1,
fx5 : F → F
a 7→ b−1a−1b, b 7→ b−1dc−2, c 7→ cb−1a−1b, d 7→ dc−2;
fx6= (N1)1(N2)2.3(N2)3.1(N1)2(N2)1.2(N2)4.2,
fx6 : F → F
a 7→ a−1c−1b−1, b 7→ c−1b−1, c 7→ ca−1, d 7→ dc−1b−1;
fx7= [(N2)2.1]
3(N1)3[(N2)4.3]
3(N1)1(N2)1.2(N1)2(N2)2.4(N2)3.1,
fx7 : F → F
a 7→ a−1ba3, b 7→ a−3b−1dc−3, c 7→ c−1a−1ba3, d 7→ dc−3;
fx8= (N2)1.4(N1)2(N1)3(N2)2.1[(N2)3.4]
2(N1)4(N1)1(N1)3(N2)4.2,
fx8 : F → F
a 7→ d−1a−1, b 7→ b−1ad, c 7→ d−2c, d 7→ d−1b−1ad.
Note, that the regular Nielsen transformations are applied from the left
to the right.
2.2 The ciphertext is now
C =fx1(I)fx2(L)fx3(I)fx4(K)fx5(E)fx6(B)fx7(O)fx8(B)
=fx1(d
2c−2)fx2(bc
−1bab−1)fx3(d
2c−2)fx4(c
2ba)fx5(cd)fx6(a
−1d3c−1)
fx7(a
−1b)fx8(a
−1d3c−1)
=dc−1d−1a−1d−2a−1c−1 ≀ d−1bcabd−1a−1cadb−1d ≀
(ba−1d−1)2(a−1d−1c)2 ≀ (ca2)2b−1a3daca2 ≀ cb−1a−1bdc−2≀
bca(dc−1b−1)3ac−1 ≀ a−1(a−2b−1)2dc−3 ≀ (ab−1)3adc−1d2
=c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8.
The symbol “ ≀” marks the end of a ciphertext unit ci.
3. Bob gets the ciphertext
C =dc−1d−1a−1d−2a−1c−1 ≀ d−1bcabd−1a−1cadb−1d ≀
(ba−1d−1)2(a−1d−1c)2 ≀ (ca2)2b−1a3daca2 ≀ cb−1a−1bdc−2≀
bca(dc−1b−1)3ac−1 ≀ a−1(a−2b−1)2dc−3 ≀ (ab−1)3adc−1d2
from Alice. Now he knows, that he needs eight automorphisms for decryp-
tion.
3.1. Bob knows the set U , the linear congruence generator h and the starting
seed automorphism f93. For decryption he uses tables (analogously to
Table 1).
Now, he is able to compute for each automorphism fxi the set Ufxi ,
i = 1, 2, . . . , 8, and to generate the tables Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and
Table 5.
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Table 2. Correspondence: plaintext alphabet to ciphertext alphabet I
Ufx1
Ufx2
A b(c−1ad2)2c−1 d−1bd−1a−1c2ad
E cad(dc−1)2 d−1a−1c−1(dca)2d
I dc−1d−1a−1d−2a−1c−1 ((dca)2d)2cadcad
O cd−2a−1bc−1 d−1a−1c−1ab
U (ad2c−1)3ad2b−1 d−1a−1c4adb−1d
T (bc−1)2bd−2a−1cd−2a−1 (d−1b)3d−1a−1c−2ad
M b(ad2)3c−1 d−1b(d−1a−1c−1)3
L bd−2a−1c−1bc−1ad2b−1 d−1bcabd−1a−1cadb−1d
K c(ad2)2c−1bc−1ad2c−1 (d−1a−1c−1)2d−1bd−1a−1cad
Y c(ad2)2c−1dc−1ad2b−1 (d−1a−1c−1)2dcadc2adb−1d
B cd−2a−1(dc−1)2d−1a−1c−1 d−1a−1c−1(ad2cadc)3adcad
N (ad2c−1)2d(c−1b)2d−1 d−1a−1c2ad(dca)2bd−1b(d−1a−1c−1)2d−1
Table 3. Correspondence: plaintext alphabet to ciphertext alphabet II
Ufx3
Ufx4
A a−1d−1(ab3)2 b−1a3d(aca2)2
E c−1daba−1d−1 ca2db−1a3d
I (ba−1d−1)2(a−1d−1c)2 (db−1a3d)2a−2c−1a−2c−1
O b−3a−2d−1 a−2c−1a−1b−1a3d
U (ab3)4da (aca2)4d−1a−3b
T (a−1d−1)3(b−3a−1)2 (b−1a3d)3a−2c−1a−3c−1a−1
M a−1d−1(c−1da)3 b−1a3d(ca2)3
L (a−1d−1)2ca−1d−1ab3da b−1a3da−2c−1b−1a3daca2d−1a−3b
K c−1dac−1ab3 (ca2)2b−1a3daca2
Y (c−1da)2ba−1d−1ab3da (ca2)2db−1a3daca2d−1a−3b
B b−3a−1(ba−1d−1)3a−1d−1c a−2c−1a−1(db−1a3d)3a−2c−1
N (ab3)2b(a−1d−1)2b−1 aca3c(a2db−1a)2a2
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Table 4. Correspondence: plaintext alphabet to ciphertext alphabet III
Ufx5
Ufx6
A b−1dc−2b−1a−2b (c−1b−1a−1)2c−1b−1
E cb−1a−1bdc−2 ca−1dc−1b−1
I dc−2dc−1(c−1b−1ab)2c−1 (dc−1b−1)2ac−1ac−1
O b−1adc−2 bcac−1b−1
U b−1a−4bc2d−1b (a−1c−1b−1)3a−1
T (b−1dc−2)3b−1a2b (c−1b−1)2abca
M b−1dc−1(b−1a−1bc)2b−1a−1b c−1b−1(ca−1)3
L b−1dc−2b−1abc−1b−1dc−2b−1a−1bc2d−1b c−1b−1ac−2b−1a−1
K cb−1a−1bcb−1a−1dc−2b−1a−1b ca−1c(a−1c−1b−1)2
Y (cb−1a−1b)2dc−2b−1a−1bc2d−1b (ca−1)2dc−1b−1a−1
B b−1ab(dc−2)3b−1abc−1 bca(dc−1b−1)3ac−1
N b−1a−2b(dc−2b−1)2 (a−1c−1b−1)2d(c−1b−1)2d−1
Table 5. Correspondence: plaintext alphabet to ciphertext alphabet IV
Ufx7
Ufx8
A a−3b−1dc−3a−1(ba2)2a b−1d−1a−1
E c−1a−1ba3dc−3 d−2cd−1b−1ad
I dc−3dc−3(a−3b−1ac)2 d−1(b−1a)2(dc−1d)2d
O a−1(a−2b−1)2dc−3 adb−1ad
U a−1(ba2)4ac3d−1ba3 (d−1a−1)5b
T (a−3b−1dc−3)3a−1(a−2b−1)2a (b−1ad)3adad
M a−3b−1dc−3(c−1a−1ba3)3 b−1a(d−1cd−1)2d−1c
L a−3b−1dc−3a−3b−1aca−3b−1dc−3a−1ba3c3d−1ba3 b−1adc−1d2b−1d−1a−1b
K c−1a−1ba3c−1a−1dc−3a−1ba3 (d−2c)2b−1
Y (c−1a−1ba3)2dc−3a−1ba3c3d−1ba3 (d−2c)2d−1b−1d−1a−1b
B a−3b−1a(dc−3)3a−3b−1ac (ab−1)3adc−1d2
N a−1(ba2)2a(dc−3a−3b−1)2 (d−1a−1)2d−1(b−1ad)2d
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3.2. With these tables he is able to generate the plaintext from Alice, it is
S =f−1x1
(
dc−1d−1a−1d−2a−1c−1
)
f−1x2
(
d−1bcabd−1a−1cadb−1d
)
f−1x3 ((ba
−1d−1)2(a−1d−1c)2)f−1x4
(
(ca2)2b−1a3daca2
)
f−1x5
(
cb−1a−1bdc−2
)
f−1x6
(
bca(dc−1b−1)3ac−1
)
f−1x7
(
a−1(a−2b−1)2dc−3
)
f−1x8
(
(ab−1)3adc−1d2
)
=I LIKE BOB.
Security
This private key cryptosystem is secure against chosen plaintext attacks
and chosen ciphertext attacks. In a chosen plaintext attack, an attacker, Eve,
chooses an arbitrary plaintext of her choice and gets the corresponding cipher-
text. In a chosen ciphertext attack Eve sees ciphertexts and gets to some of
these ciphertexts the corresponding plaintexts (see also [1]).
An eavesdropper, Eve, intercepts the ciphertext
C = c1c2 · · · cz,
with ci = fxi(uj) for some 1 ≤ j ≤ N . If Alice and Bob choose non character-
istic subgroups, then it is likely that cj /∈ FU for some 1 ≤ j ≤ z. Hence the
ciphertext units give no hint for the subgroup FU . Eve knows L =
∑z
k=1 |ck|,
the length of C, because Alice and Bob are doing no cancellations between ci
and ci+1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ z − 1.
To break the system Eve needs to know the set U . For this it is likely that
she assumes that the ball B(F,L) in the Cayleygraph for F contains a basis
for FU . With this assumption she searches for primitive elements for FU in the
ball B(F,L), |y| ≤ L, y ∈ F . In fact she needs to find N primitive elements for
FU in B(F,L) (these would be primitive elements for FU in a ball B(FU , L)
for some Nielsen reduced basis for FU ). From Proposition 4 and Theorem 2 it
is known that the number of primitive elements grows exponentially with the
free length of the elements. Eve chooses sets Mi := {mi1 ,mi2 , . . . ,miK} with
K ≥ N and elements mij in B(F,L) and with Nielsen transformations she
constructs the corresponding Nielsen reduced sets M ′i . If |M ′i | = N then M ′i is
a candidate for U .
The number N is a constant in the cryptosystem, hence it takes O(λ2) time,
with λ := max{|mjℓ | | ℓ = 1, 2, . . . ,K} ≤ L, to get the set M ′j from Mj with
the algorithm [16] (see Remark 3).
The main security certification depends on the fact, that for a single sub-
set of K elements Eve finds a Nielsen reduced set in polynomial running time
(more precisely in quadratic time) but she has to test all possible subsets of K
elements for which she needs exponential running time.
The security certification can be improved by the next two improvements.
16 Anja I. S. Moldenhauer and Gerhard Rosenberger
First, Alice and Bob choose in addition an explicit presentation of the ci-
phertext units ci as matrices in SL(2,Q). So, they agree on a faithful represen-
tation
ϕ : F → SL(2,Q)
xi 7→Mi,
of F into SL(2,Q) (see Theorem 4). The group G = ϕ(F ) is isomorphic to F
under the mapping xi 7→Mi, for i = 1, . . . , q. The ciphertext is now
C′ = ϕ(c1)ϕ(c2) · · ·ϕ(cz)
=W1W2 · · ·Wz ,
a sequence of matrices Wj ∈ SL(2,Q). The encryption is realizable with a
table (as Table 1) if the representation ϕ is applied to the elements in the
table. Therefore Bob gets a table with matrices and hence an assignment from
the matrices to the plaintext alphabet depending on the automorphisms fxi .
Here the additional security certification is, that there is no algorithm
known to solve the membership problem (see for instance [10]) for subgroups
of SL(2,Q) which are not subgroups in SL(2,Z). B. Eick, M. Kirschner and
C. Leedham-Green presented in the paper [5] a practical algorithm to solve
the constructive membership problem for discrete free subgroups of rank 2 of
SL(2,R). For example, the subgroup SL(2,Z) of SL(2,R) is discrete. But they
also mention, that it is an open problem to solve the membership problem for
arbitrary subgroups of SL(2,R) with rank m ≥ 2. Alice and Bob work with
subgroups of rank N ≥ 2. Hence there is in general no algorithm known for
Eve to solve the membership problem, in particular there is always no such
algorithm known for N ≥ 3.
Example 2. In this example3 Alice and Bob agree additionally to Example 1
on a faithful representation. With Theorem 4 they generate the matrices
X1 :=
(
−7
2
45
4
1 −72
)
, X2 :=
(
−15
2
221
4
1 −152
)
and X3 :=
(
−23
2
525
4
1 −232
)
.
These matrices form a basis for a free group G of rank 3. Alice and Bob
generate a subgroup G1 of G with rank 4. The free generating set for G1
is {X1X2, X3X21 , X2X3X2, X−11 X2}. They choose the faithful representation
ϕ : F → SL(2,Q)
a 7→ X1X2 =
(
75
2
−1111
4
−11 1632
)
, b 7→ X3X21 =
(−1189 3990
104 −349
)
,
c 7→ X2X3X2 =
(−2681 19966
360 −2681
)
, d 7→ X−11 X2 =
(
15 −109
4 −29
)
.
3 We realized this example with the computer programs Classic Worksheet Maple 16
and GAP. In GAP we used the package “FGA” (Free Group Algorithms, a GAP4
Package by Christian Sievers, TU Braunschweig).
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The ciphertext is now
C′ =ϕ(dc−1d−1a−1d−2a−1c−1) ϕ(d−1bcabd−1a−1cadb−1d)
ϕ((ba−1d−1)2(a−1d−1c)2) ϕ((ca2)2b−1a3daca2) ϕ(cb−1a−1bdc−2)
ϕ(bca(dc−1b−1)3ac−1) ϕ(a−1(a−2b−1)2dc−3) ϕ((ab−1)3adc−1d2)
=
(
−429743093559909
2
−6400784021410159
4
−62588240305379 −9322169791170852
)
(
−3240070331754423030683243991
2
47007695458416827592369656315
4
−223326322203710575272321977 32400703278301507513861943612
)
(
−6899014060703475554169965
2
102756972145191520348785607
4
301722468685102729969483 −44939881318479457049971092
)
(
−397074726172421275253684843812134445
2
5883318761059670223751985896578473377
4
26659253089426526822952736194350493 −3950009243065107510522884252187907572
)
(
46475888407425825
2
692232489736400389
4
−3120351373297111 −464758969436877592
)
(
−37154085868492177463035768197599
2
−553374013794643763898030444104547
4
1624906569753714749910956723073 242014047587814020657193189918732
)
(
−3418963163764785449276501363
2
−50923553357916815212095363641
4
−230751369629481141540301125 −34369132163448136510543410832
)
(
2739747352948144349387
2
−39628644296581967709615
4
−402070084312200114547 58156794407920268551072
)
.
Instead of a sequence of words in F Alice sends to Bob a sequence of eight
matrices in SL(2,Q).
For the second improvement Alice and Bob use instead of a presentation
of the ciphertext in SL(2,Q) a presentation of the ciphertext in a free group
in GL(2, k) with k := Z[y1, y2, . . . , yw], the ring of polynomials in variables
y1, y2, . . . , yw. With the help of a homomorphism ǫ
∗ : GL(2, k) → GL(2,Z)
and the knowledge of an algorithm to write each element in the modular group
PSL(2,Z), the group of 2× 2 projective integral matrices of determinant 1, in
terms of s and t they can reconstruct the message. Here,
s =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
and t = ( 1 10 1 )
and PSL(2,Z) = 〈s, t | s2 = (st)3 = 1〉.
Every finitely generated free group is faithfully represented by a subgroup
of the modular group PSL(2,Z). Especially, the two matrices(
0 1
−1 2
)
and
(
2 1
−1 0
)
generate a free group of rank two, and this free group certainly contains finitely
generated free groups.
This improvement is very similar to the version in [1]. Here, the security
certification depends in addition on the unsolvability of Hilbert’s Tenth Prob-
lem. Y. Matiyasevich proved in [11] that there is no general algorithm which
determines whether or not an integral polynomial in any number of variables
has a zero.
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5 Public Key Cryptosystem Based on Automorphisms
of Free Groups F
Now we describe a public key cryptosystem for Alice and Bob which is inspired
by the ElGamal cryptosystem (see [6] or [13, Section 1.3]), based on discrete
logarithms, that is:
1. Alice and Bob agree on a finite cyclic group G and a generating element
g ∈ G.
2. Alice picks a random natural number a and publishes the element c := ga.
3. Bob, who wants to transmit a message m ∈ G to Alice, picks a random
natural number b and sends the two elements m · cb and gb, to Alice. Note
that cb = gab.
4. Alice recovers m =
(
m · cb) · ((gb)a)−1.
Let X = {x1, x2, . . . , xN}, N ≥ 2, be the free generating set of the free
group F = 〈X | 〉. It is X±1 = X ∪X−1. The message is an element m ∈ S∗,
the set of all freely reduced words with letters in X±1. Public are the free
group F , its free generating set X and an element a ∈ S∗. The automorphism
f should be chosen randomly, for example as it is described in Section 3.
The public key cryptosystem is now as follows:
Public parameters: The group F = 〈X | 〉, a freely reduced word a 6= 1
in the free group F and an automorphism f : F → F of infinite order.
Encryption and Decryption Procedure:
1. Alice chooses privately a natural number n and publishes the element
fn(a) =: c ∈ S∗.
2. Bob picks privately a random t ∈ N and his message m ∈ S∗. He calculates
the freely reduced elements
m · f t(c) =: c1 ∈ S∗ and f t(a) =: c2 ∈ S∗.
He sends the ciphertext (c1, c2) ∈ S∗ × S∗ to Alice.
3. Alice calculates
c1 · fn(c2)−1 = m · f t(c) · fn(c2)−1
= m · f t(fn(a)) · (fn(f t(a))−1
= m · f t+n(a) · (fn+t(a))−1
= m,
and gets the message m.
Remark 7. A possible attacker, Eve, can see the elements c, c1, c2 ∈ S∗. She
does not know the free length of m and the cancellations between m and f t(c)
in c1. It could be possible that m is completely canceled by the first letters of
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f t(c). Hence she cannot determine m from the given c1. Eve just sees words,
f t(a) and fn(a), in the free generating set X from which it is unlikely to realize
the exponents n and t, that is, the private keys from Alice and Bob, respectively.
The security certification is based on the Diffie-Hellman-Problem.
Remark 8. We give some ideas to enhance the security, they can also be com-
bined:
1. The element a ∈ S∗ could be taken as a common private secret between
Alice and Bob. They could use for example the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key
exchange protocol (see [13]) to agree on the element a.
2. Alice and Bob agree on a faithful representation from F into the special
linear group of all 2×2matrices with entries in Q, that is, g : F → SL(2,Q).
Now m ∈ S∗ and Bob sends g(m) · g(f t(c)) =: c1 ∈ SL(2,Q) instead of
m · f t(c) =: c1 ∈ S∗; c and c2 remain the same. Therefore, Alice calculates
c1 ·(g(fn(c2)))−1 = g(m) and hence the messagem = g−1(g(m)) ∈ S∗. This
variation in addition extends the security certification to the membership
problem in the matrix group SL(2,Q) (see [5]).
Example 3.
This example4 is a very small one and it is just given for illustration purposes.
Bob wants to send a message to Alice.
The public parameters are the free group F = 〈x1, x2, x3 | 〉 of rank 3,
the freely reduced word a ∈ F , with a := x21x2x−23 x2 and the automorphism
f : F → F , which is given, for this example, by regular Nielsen transformations:
f = [(N2)1.2]
2 (N2)3.2 (N1)3 (N2)2.3, that is,
x1 7→ x1x22, x2 7→ x−13 , x3 7→ x−12 x−13 .
1. Alice’s private key is n = 7. Thus, she gets the automorphism
f7 : F → F
x1 7→ x1x22x−13 x2(x2x3)2(x3x2x23x2)2x3x2
x2 7→ x−12 ((x−13 x−12 x−13 )2x−12 x−13 )2x−13 x−12 x−23
x3 7→ (((x−12 x−13 )2x−13 )2x−12 x−23 )2x−12 (x−13 x−12 x−13 )2x−13 .
Her public key is
c := f7(a) =(x1x
2
2x
−1
3 x2(x2x3)
2(x3x2x
2
3x2)
2x3x2)
2(x23x2)
2
((x3x2x3)
2x2x3)
2x3x2x
2
3x2x
−1
3 .
2. Bob privately picks the ephemeral key t = 5 and gets the automorphism
f5 : F → F
x1 7→ x1x22x−13 x22x3(x3x2)2
x2 7→ x−12 (x−13 x−12 x−13 )2x−13
x3 7→ ((x−12 x−13 )2x−13 )2x−12 x−23 .
4 We used the computer program GAP and the package “FGA” (Free Group Algo-
rithms, a GAP4 Package by Christian Sievers, TU Braunschweig).
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His message for Alice is m = x−23 x
2
2x3x
2
1x
−1
2 x
−1
1 . He calculates
c1 =m · f5(c)
=x−23 x
2
2x3x
2
1(x2x
−1
3 )
2((x−13 x
−1
2 x
−2
3 x
−1
2 )
2x−23 x
−1
2 )
2(x−13 x
−1
2 x
−1
3 )
2x−13 x
−1
2
((((x−13 x
−1
2 x
−1
3 )
2x−12 x
−1
3 )
2x−13 x
−1
2 x
−1
3 x
−1
2 x
−1
3 )
2(x−13 x
−1
2 x
−2
3 x
−1
2 )
2x−13
x−12 x
−1
3 )
2((x−13 x
−1
2 x
−2
3 x
−1
2 )
2x−23 x
−1
2 )
2(x−13 x
−1
2 x
−1
3 )
2x−13 x1x
2
2x
−1
3 x2(x
−1
3
(((x−13 x
−1
2 x
−2
3 x
−1
2 )
2x−23 x
−1
2 )
2(x−13 x
−1
2 x
−1
3 )
2x−13 x
−1
2 )
3(x−13 x
−1
2 x
−1
3 )
2
x−12 x
−1
3 ((x
−1
3 x
−1
2 x
−2
3 x
−1
2 )
2x−23 x
−1
2 )
2(x−13 x
−1
2 x
−1
3 )
2x−12 )
3x−13
((x−13 x
−1
2 x
−2
3 x
−1
2 )
2x−23 x
−1
2 )
2(x−13 x
−1
2 x
−1
3 )
2x−12 x
−1
3 x2
and
c2 := f
5(a) = (x1x
2
2x
−1
3 x
2
2x3(x3x2)
2)2x23x2(x3x2x3)
2x3x2x
−1
3 .
The ciphertext for Alice is the tuple (c1, c2).
3. Alice first computes
(f7(c2))
−1 =x−12 (((((x3x2)
2x3)
2x3x2x3)
2x3x2(x3x2x3)
2)2x3x2
((x3x2x3)
2x2x3)
2x3x2x3)
2(x3x2(((x3x2x3)
2x2x3)
2x3x2x3x2x3)
2
(x3x2x
2
3x2)
2x3)
2x2(((((x
2
3x2)
2x3x2)
2x23x2x3x2)
2x3
(x3x2x
2
3x2)
2x3x2)
2x3(x3x2x
2
3x2)
2x23x2
(((x3x2x3)
2x2x3)
2x3x2x3x2x3)
2(x3x2x
2
3x2)
2x3
(x3x
−1
2 )
2x−12 x
−1
1 )
2
and gets m by
m = c1 · (f7(c2))−1 = x−23 x22x3x21x−12 x−11 .
6 Conclusion
In comparison to the standard cryptosystems which are mostly based on num-
ber theory we explained two cryptosystems which use combinatorial group the-
ory. The first cryptosystem in Section 4 is a one-time pad, which choice of
the random sequence for encryption is not number-theoretic. At the moment
it is costlier than the standard systems but it is another option for a one-time
pad which is based on combinatorial group theory and not on number theory.
The second cryptosystem in Section 5 is similar to the ElGamal cryptosystem
(see [6]), which is easier to handle. The ElGamal cryptosystem is based on the
discrete logarithm problem over a finite field. If this problem should eventu-
ally be solved we introduced here an alternative system, which is not based on
number theory.
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